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ABSTRACT 
In response to the limited engagement with critical social science concerning the governance 
of Islamic banking and finance (IBF), this paper compares and conceptualizes the development 
and governance of IBF in Malaysia and Singapore. We argue that IBF governance in Malaysia 
and Singapore can be distinguished on the basis of ethnic politics, moral suasion, product 
demand, product innovation, and the character of state practices. Concerning the latter, we 
contend that the political economy of both countries can be characterized as broadly involving 
a ‘neoliberal-developmentalism’ (Liow, 2012), but we nuance this by positing a transition in 
Malaysia from a ‘semi-developmentalism’ in the 1980s to what we call an ‘Islamic and 
internationalising ordoliberalism’ beginning in the 2000s. In turn, the governance of IBF in 
Singapore involves a combination of neoliberal developmentalism, which nonetheless also 
entails some form of Islamic ordoliberalism.  
Key words: development, Islamic finance, international financial centre, governance, 
neoliberalisation, Malaysia, Singapore  
 
1  Introduction  
While the evolution and governance of Islamic banking and finance (IBF) in Malaysia 
has received considerable empirical attention, Singapore has remained outside the focus of 
most research on IBF, and in both cases, the development and governance of IBF has 
received little theoretical or conceptual treatment. In addressing this lacuna in the literature, 
we offer a comparison of IBF in a Muslim-majority country (Malaysia) and Muslim-minority 
country (Singapore) since the 1980s to analyze the ways in which the practice of IBF has 
unfolded across these two different state spaces, and discuss their significance for a 
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conceptual understanding of the development and governance of IBF. While both states have 
legitimized the pursuit of IBF as part of an agenda to secure and build upon Kuala Lumpur 
and Singapore’s aspirations as international financial centers (IFCs), the development and 
governance of IBF in these two national states have taken different turns through different 
mechanisms and forms of institutional governance.  
To be more specific, we contend that both the Malaysian and Singaporean states 
exhibit features of ‘neoliberal-developmentalism’ (Liow 2012; Elias and Rethel, 2016). 
However, for Malaysia, we argue that this involved a ‘semi-developmentalism’ during the 
1980s that gradually evolved into an Islamic and internationally-oriented ‘ordoliberalism’ 
rather than a strictly market-driven approach over the last 15 years. For Singapore, while 
certainly not discounting broader developmental efforts, we maintain that the government has 
pursued a more market-driven approach for IBF but which also increasingly involves 
elements of ordo-liberalism. With such broad political economic distinctions in mind, we 
then focus on particular rationales and practices to distinguish between the governance of IBF 
in the two countries, based on the presence of ethnic politics, the moral suasion employed by 
domestic agencies in promoting Islamic financial product innovation (such as sukuk); the 
extent of the demand for Sharia-compliant banking and financial products, the centrality of 
Sharia governance, the substantive fiscal support provided by the Malaysian government as 
compared to the more passive ‘tax neutrality’ approach of the Singaporean state; and the 
more comprehensive and activist approach taken in Malaysia to construct a fully-fledged IBF 
‘ecosystem’ in contrast to a more selective and market-based approach in Singapore.  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we briefly outline 
the main contours of IBF and argue for a critical conceptual approach to analyzing how the 
international financial architecture and national political economies might intersect in the 
development of new financial markets—in this case, that of IBF in Malaysia and Singapore. 
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We then sketch out the currently limited conceptual literature on IBF in Malaysia and 
Singapore in Section 3.  In Sections 4 and 5, we present empirical analyses of the 
development and governance of IBF in Malaysia and Singapore to illustrate our conceptual 
arguments. In the conclusion, we reiterate our main findings and reflect upon our contribution 
to the existing critical social scientific literature on the governance of IBF, as well as 
considering some avenues for further research. 
 
2 Conceptualizing IBF in a post-neoliberal world? 
IBF is a form of banking and finance which is rooted in Sharia law, and is considered 
by many of its practitioners to be a more ‘socially just’ system of finance than ‘conventional 
finance’. IBF entails a number of prohibitions. Among the most pivotal is the injunction 
against riba (interest). Other, perhaps equally important prohibitions include Gharar 
(excessive risk, uncertainty), maysir (gambling) and ‘making money from money’ (currency 
speculation or many financial derivatives would be examples). In addition, Islamic financial 
institutions (IFIs) should not invest in businesses that trade in products, services, or forms of 
entertainment deemed haram. In light of the prohibition on ‘making money from money’, 
financial transactions should in principle be asset-based, such as around real estate or 
commodities. IBF products and services extend across the spectrum from deposit accounts to 
project-financing to takaful (insurance). While transactions that are rooted in ‘equity-
financing’ or ‘profit-sharing’ (referred to as musharaka and mudarabah) are often seen as 
ideal by Sharia scholars and many Islamic bankers and financiers, a dominant form of 
contract continues to be murabaha or cost-plus financing, which, like other financial 
instruments such as sukuk (Islamic bonds), have produced debate among many observers 
(both Muslim and non-Muslim alike) as to the ‘Islamicness’ of IBF. The decision to deem a 
certain product or service as Islamically acceptable is the work of Sharia scholars of a given 
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Sharia Supervisory Board and this itself involves ijtihad  or the interpretation of the Qu’ran 
and the Hadiths.  Institutionally, most Islamic banks and other IFIs will have their own 
Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB) which pronounce on (but may not be the ultimate arbiter of) 
the ‘Islamicness’ or Sharia-compliance of particular transactions. 
One way of incorporating a critical conceptual approach to the governance of IBF is 
to think about ‘neoliberalisation’ in somewhat more nuanced terms. This can be achieved 
initially through what Brenner et al. (2010) call ‘variegated neoliberalisation’ and more 
specifically ‘market disciplinary rule regimes’ (for our purposes here, we mean the 
International Financial Architecture or IFA). Their general and abstract concept of ‘rule 
regimes’ are described as entailing ‘…transnationally interconnected, rolling programs of 
market-driven reform that draw upon shared vocabularies, policy repertoires and institutional 
mechanisms derived from earlier rounds of market driven regulatory experimentation’ (p. 
209). These in turn shape how capital accumulation unfolds. In less abstract terms, the IFA 
has become a commonplace concept for describing a lattice of institutions, rules, regulations, 
standards, and practices that regulate international monetary management and payments, 
insurance, accountancy, and corporate governance, dominated by wealthier countries and 
associated with neoliberalisation. In this sense, the IFA is generally understood to include a 
related coterie of both state and non-state (private) institutions, such as (but not limited to) 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the Financial Stability Board, the International 
Accounting Standards Board, the International Financial Reporting Standards, the 
International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. While the concept of a global financial 
architecture has considerable appeal, we maintain that this architecture should be more 
properly labelled an international financial architecture — one that conceptually privileges 
national governments in the formation, interpretation, modification or non-compliance of 
supposedly global regulation, rules, and standards. In short, the IFA is domesticated in 
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different ways and states have differential capacities to implement adjustment policies and to 
support or undermine the existing IFA (e.g. Walter 2008). Moreover, the ways in which 
Islamic financial standards and practices have unfolded across national economies also 
intersects with this uneven landscape of IFA and state power in variegated ways, as we will 
demonstrate through the empirical cases of IBF in Malaysia and Singapore.  
With respect to the relationship between the IFA and IBF, a handful of critical/non- 
neo-classical conceptual studies have explored the relationship between the governance of 
conventional finance and the governance of IBF (Fang 2014; Karim, 2010; Mohamad and 
Saravanamuttu, 2015; Pollard and Samers, 2007, 2013; Pitluck 2013; Rethel 2010a). While 
Pitluck (2013) argues that IBF is governed through a ‘mimesis’ of the IFA, Rethel (2010a) 
offers a more nuanced argument of the ways in which ‘…while Islamic finance challenges 
Western, more specifically Anglo-American dominance of the international financial system, 
at the same time it serves to reproduce, to legitimise and thus to further entrench the 
knowledge structures that underpin contemporary finance’ (2010a: 76). This means that in 
terms of establishing and strengthening the legitimacy of IBF, the specific products as well as 
their governance structures must necessarily appeal to the traditional Muslim constituency as 
well as the realm of global finance within which IBF seeks to become established. Fang 
(2014), in turn, argues against Susan Strange’s ‘structural power’ of ‘conventional financial 
practices’ and instead suggests that the actors associated with IBF do not necessarily need to 
acquiesce to the ‘structural power’ of the supposed IFA and its neoliberalising processes. 
Following on from the arguments above, we draw upon the idea of ‘small n’ neoliberalism 
(Ong 2006; Collier 2012) in conceptualizing the development and governance of IBF. This 
approach does not begin with neoliberalisation but imagine it as only one dimension of 
political economy. In this vein, the development and governance of IBF should not be viewed 
just as an alternative to conventional banking and finance; instead we hold to the view that 
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IBF participates in the emergence of a multipolar financial landscape by shifting the flow and 
concentration of capital from Euro-American financial hubs to other regions (e.g. Pollard and 
Samers, 2007), as well as the ways in which the IFA and national political economies might 
intersect in the development of new financial markets. 
 
3 On national political economies   
With or without reference to IBF, the national political economies of Malaysia and 
Singapore have been characterized as developmentalist or developmental (e.g. Funston, 2001; 
Lai, 2015), as authoritarian strong states (Slater 2012); and, in the case of Singapore, as a 
hybrid ‘neoliberal-developmental’ state (Liow 2012). Malaysia has been analyzed as ‘semi-
developmentalist’ (Henderson, 1999; Rhodes and Higgott, 2000), as shaped by ‘acquisitive  
corruption’ and as a ‘weak’ state (Henderson, 1999); as ‘neoliberal developmental’ (Elias and 
Rethel, 2016), as ‘post-developmental’ with neoliberal strategies in which specific zones (or 
regions) and populations within countries are turned outwards towards an engagement with 
the neoliberal global financial order (Ong 2006); as formerly ‘crony capitalist’ changing to 
neoliberal after 2000 (Rethel 2010b), and as a ‘competitive authoritarian’ regime (Pepinsky 
2009). The effect of cultural and religious practices on state power and governance, 
particularly in Malaysia have also been noted in terms of how states address Islamist 
challenges (Henderson, 1999; Nasr, 2001). 
At this point, it is worth elaborating on the ideas of the ‘neoliberal developmental’ 
state and ‘semi-developmentalism’ in terms of their significance for conceptualizing IBF. For 
Liow, the ‘neoliberal development state’ involves ‘integrating aspects of the neoliberal 
economic model into the developmental state, with all the latter’s associated features of direct 
state intervention into the economy, and the resulting power interests and relations from such 
interventions continuing to persist’ (p. 243). As such, ‘neoliberal’ involves at least two 
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elements: a ‘neoliberal governmentality’ in a Foucauldian sense (that is ‘the conduct of 
conduct’) and a ‘regulatory neoliberalism’. The latter is what concerns us here, and we see 
this as regulatory restructuring that comprises both market-making processes and the rise of 
marketised forms of governance, although with different features and temporalities for 
Malaysia and Singapore.  
Developmentalism as a concept is often poorly defined in the literature, and its 
continued relevance has been debated.1 For the purpose of this paper, we take it to mean not 
just strong state intervention geared towards economic growth, as Liow seems to generically 
define it, but that a ‘state is developmental when it establishes as its principle of legitimacy 
its ability to promote and sustain development’ (Castells 1992: 56–7, cited in Stubbs 2009, 
6). In this sense, we view the Malaysian state as ‘semi-developmentalist’ insofar as i) it 
retains many elements of developmentalism (see e.g. Lai, 2015) in its direction of certain 
economic ‘projects’ – among them the growth of IBF, but ii) it has been shaped by, and also 
legitimated through, ‘ethnic politics’. We elaborate on this in the subsequent discussion.  
In Malaysia, the rise and governance of IBF specifically has received considerable 
empirical attention concerning its emergence in the 1980s and its rapid growth in the 1990s 
and 2000s (e.g. Ariff and Rosly, 2011; Hadiz and Khoo 2011; Haneef 2001; Karim 2010; Lai, 
2015; Liow 2009; Mohamad and Saravanamuttu, 2015; Naguib and Smucker, 2010; Nasr 
2001; Rudnyckyj, 2014; Tripp, 2006; Venardos 2012; Wilson 1998). This literature assumes 
three strands. First, much of it highlights the ambivalent ‘modernisation’, ‘westernisation’, or 
‘globalisation’ associated with the intersection of economic development and IBF in 
Malaysia. Others tend to situate IBF within a wider Islamisation of economic activity in 
Malaysia. Among these, Nasr (2001) makes two points. He insists on the state’s promotion of 
a ‘moderate’ Islamisation of the financial sector, for example, as a way to control and co-opt 
Islamically-inflected political parties.  Furthermore, Nasr stressed the state’s preoccupation 
 8 
 
with economic growth and hegemony over an ethnically fractured postcolonial society, in 
which paradoxically, an ascendant private sector coincided with increasing control of ‘the 
economy’ by the state. While Mohamad and Saravanamuttu (2015) certainly follow in this 
vein, they highlight a paradox in which IBF involves ‘an alliance of capitalists and 
technocrats’ which avoids ‘…the encumbrances of religion whenever it is imperative to do so 
even when they are dependent on religion for their legitimacy’ (p. 212). They argue further 
that ‘in despite or because of this paradox, IBF fits well within the restructuring agenda of a 
post-neoliberal global financial order’ (ibid). This is accomplished through a ‘decoupling of 
its institutional make-up from the traditional, mainstream religious structures of the state’ 
(ibid). Ultimately, for Islamic bankers, financiers, and their regulators, IBF is projected not as 
an artifact of religion but molded into a saleable product. Thus, as Mohamad and 
Saravanamuttu contest, practitioners and regulators of Islamic finance oscillate between 
religious legitimacy (a certain moral suasion) and putatively non-Islamic practices.   
From a less ideology or discourse-centred perspective, an implicit debate asks 
whether developmental or more market logics are at work in the evolution and governance of 
IBF in Malaysia. On one hand, Lai (2015) draws parallels between financial policies and 
industrial policies and emphasizes (developmental) government policies to foster the growth 
of IBF as part of a wider strategy of building a globally-competitive national financial sector 
in Malaysia. On the other hand, Mohamad and Saravanamuttu (2015) argue that Malaysia 
involves two ‘neoliberal exceptions’ that i) entail the dominance of Malaysia’s central bank 
(Bank Negara Malaysia) over the more religiously conservative judiciary in the governance 
of IBF and ii) comprises what they call a ‘post-secular ijtihad’ (we discuss these points 
further in the empirical section). In a different terminology but echoing to some degree the 
‘neoliberalisation’ or even ‘ordoliberalisation’ of governance, Rudnyckyj (2014) speaks of 
the ‘afterlives of development’ in Malaysia, in which the state is less a developmental one 
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seeking direct investment and less ‘a direct participant’ in IBF (p. 78), than a managerial or 
incubator state that privileges private actors (institutions and individuals in Islamic financial 
networks) as agents of Islamic financial services growth beyond the state. To be more 
precise, the state no longer creates commercial firms (as it did in the 1970s and 1980s), nor 
does it endeavor to support them financially, but rather incubates them through institutional 
infrastructure. While neither the timing nor a conceptual understanding of the rise of the 
managerial or incubator state are offered by him, the form of state Rudnyckyj has in mind 
seems to combine both neoliberal and ‘ordoliberal’ practices; the latter involving state 
practices designed to ensure ‘economic freedom’ through inter alia the guarantee of 
competition and the promotion of entrepreneurialism (e.g. Bonefeld 2011). In context, this 
would involve the management and regulation of IBF in order to expand the domestic and 
international demand for IBF. 
 In contrast to Malaysia, there has been a distinctive paucity of both theoretical and 
empirical research on IBF in Singapore. Scholarly and more policy-oriented research on IBF 
predominantly relates to legal frameworks and governance issues arising from implementing 
Sharia laws on financial products and implications for compliance and risk management 
(Chia and Wang 2008; White 2009). Other studies are broad surveys of IBF markets and 
services in Singapore with limited engagement with critical social science theories or 
political economic analysis (Gerrard and Cunningham 1997; Venardos 2012). Since the early 
2000s, the Singapore government has embarked on a distinctive push towards developing the 
city-state as a premier IFC and regional financial services hub, particularly in terms of 
developing deeper and more diverse capital markets and widening range of financial products 
and services (Lai 2013; Lai and Tan 2015). IBF in Singapore therefore sits within this context 
of a wider strategy for IFC growth. Given the limited critical conceptual interventions on the 
governance of IBF in both countries, and the lack of research on IBF in Singapore 
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specifically, we identify two challenges: conceptualizing any commonalities or differences in 
state processes across national political economies, and the need to understand the 
intersection of market disciplinary rule regimes and the development and governance of IBF 
in Malaysia and Singapore. In this paper then, we draw on the three closely related concepts 
discussed above namely: Liow’s notion of the neoliberal developmental state, ‘semi-
developmentalism’ and an Islamically-inflected neoliberalism (or even ‘ordoliberalism), in 
order to frame our empirical analysis.     
 
4  MALAYSIA  
4.1  From Islamisation to the development of IBF: semi-developmentalism in practice 
The development of IBF in Malaysia can be partly traced to ethnic politics and the 
desire to address the poverty of the Bumiputera (indigenous Muslim Malays) and urban/rural 
income inequalities through the 1971 New Economic Policy.  An embodiment of this 
continued endeavor is Mahathir Mohamad (henceforth Mahathir), who became the Prime 
Minister of Malaysia and head of the UMNO in 1981. His victory signalled the failure of 
PAS (Partai Islam Se Malaysia - an opposition party with a conservative Islamist agenda) to 
capture the interests of the growing Malaysian working and middle classes. Mahathir 
emerged as a ‘moderniser’ who viewed Islam as integral to an industrialising, modernising, 
and cosmopolitan Malaysia, despite Malaysia’s constitutionally ‘secular’ government. 
However, this Islamic revival concerned not simply the application of Sharia, but rather the 
benefit and enrichment of Muslims. Such a move would stave off protest from PAS, which 
broadly-speaking held capitalist development to be un-Islamic, while also reassuring Chinese 
entrepreneurs and investors that Malaysian Islamism would not threaten their investments. 
His political project therefore had ethical but also practical purposes (Hadiz and Khoo 2011; 
Haneef 2001; Liow 2009; Nasr 2001; Tripp 2006).  
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While Mahathir envisioned an ‘Islamic developmental state’, he sought a ‘moderate’ 
Islam distinct from a more restrictive or even radical Islam associated with the Middle East 
and PAS. He therefore wished to orient the Malaysian economy towards the ASEAN 
countries rather than towards the Middle East (Naguib and Smucker 2010; Nasr 2001). This 
presented another challenge: while Mahathir’s project gained some of its legitimacy by 
equalizing the entrepreneurial rates of Chinese Malaysians and ethnic Malays, this appeared 
to foster greater economic and political inequalities among Malays. In so doing, Nasr (2001) 
and Hadiz and Khoo (2011) argue that the ruling UMNO had to ensure its control over 
Islamic politics as a way of mitigating the possibilities of an Islamic resistance to Mahathir’s 
developmental strategies. In other words, Islamisation would be a crude way of placating the 
disaffected. This strategy seemed to work well throughout the 1980s and 1990s, as the 
Malaysian economy expanded. Ultimately, Mahathir managed to thwart widespread protest 
against the politics of the UMNO, and carry forward his version of Islamic capitalism (Case 
2009; Hadiz and Khoo 2011; Nasr 2001). While we acknowledge that Islamisation may be a 
product of what Nasr (2001) calls a weak state given the UMNO’s need to placate the PAS 
and the problems of intra-Malay inequalities, there is little doubt that during the 1980s and 
1990s, Mahathir would push through the development of IBF with little protest from poorer 
Bumiputera who viewed IBF as an antidote to the political economic power of financial elites 
in Malaysia.  
In 1981, Mahathir, together with Malaysia’s Central Bank (Bank Negara Malaysia or 
BNM), created a National Steering Committee to establish Islamic banking in Malaysia. 
Barely two years later, the UNMO passed a far-reaching Islamisation program that included 
the 1983 Islamic Banking Act, which did not Islamise the entire banking system but provided 
Muslims with an Islamic banking option. Boosted by income from oil and gas production 
(Mohamad and Sarvanamuttu, 2015), the government also established the first Islamic bank 
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in Malaysia: the Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (BIMB) in 1983 (Haneef 2001; Nasr 2001), 
which in turn established the Syarikat Takaful Malaysia in 1985, one of the first Islamic 
insurance companies in the world, and the first to provide mudarabah contracts in insurance 
(Rudnyckyj, 2014; Warde 2010). Both of these enterprises grew rapidly during the 1980s in 
the context of general market liberalisation, which entailed relaxing regulations on share 
issues, reducing corporate taxes, and lowering capital reserve requirements for banks in order 
to encourage equity purchasing and capital market expansion. These developments in IBF 
and the liberalisation of financial markets worked to UMNO’s advantage since such policies 
sought to increase the wealth of the Bumiputera. Nonetheless, IBF figured only marginally 
within Malaysian banking and finance at this point (Haneef 2001; Nasr 2001; Rethel 2010b).   
 
4.2  The governance of rapid IBF growth in Malaysia: semi-developmentalism and 
emerging ordoliberalism  
IBF in Malaysia experienced more substantive momentum from 1993 onwards. At the 
same time, financial market liberalisation, a growing interest in stocks and bonds, coupled 
with the flexible interpretation of Sharia principles (what Mohamad and Sarvanamattu (2015) 
call ‘post-secular ijtihad’) enabled the creation of the first sukuk (Islamic bond) in 1990 
(Rethel, 2010b). In 1992, Mahathir opened IKIM (the Institut Kefahaman Islam Malaysia), 
which began as a government think-tank for Islamic issues and evolved into a powerful 
organisation that published numerous documents and created policies justifying Mahathir’s 
form of Islamic (but western-inflected) capitalism, innovative IBF, and the ‘Vision 2020’ 
policy designed to propel Malaysia to the status of ‘developed country’ (Nasr 2001). The 
opening of IKIM heralded in a period of rapid growth for IBF during the 1990s, and 
Malaysian scholars and bankers soon developed a reputation for financial innovation 
(Yakcop 2003; Warde 2010).  
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To reinforce this trajectory, BNM accelerated the growth of IBF by introducing a 
scheme in 1993 allowing conventional financial institutions to operate with two divisions – 
one charging interest, and the other Sharia-compliant (their so-called ‘Islamic window’). In 
doing so, the establishment of these windows undermined the monopoly of BIMB (Lai, 
2015), and the government viewed this ‘dual system’ as the most effective and rapid means 
of increasing the number of institutions offering IBF services at the lowest cost. Again, the 
move also signalled that the government ‘maintained a prudent and evolutionary approach’ 
(ibid, 184), to the growth of IBF by referring to the ‘Interest-Free Banking Scheme’ rather 
than by constructing a fully coherent and generalized Islamic banking and financial system,  
which would also risk protest from non-Malay minorities (Haneef 2001; Haq 2010; Karim 
2010; Lai, 2015). Alongside the development of Islamic windows, the government took a 
somewhat more active move by creating Khazanah in 1993 (a sovereign wealth fund) that 
begun to issue sukuk, and whose issuances remain crucial to innovation in IBF in the 21st 
century (Lai, 2015). Furthermore, in 1994, the government created Islamic mutual funds, the 
first Islamic Interbank Money Market, Islamic debt securities, including Islamic mortgage 
bonds based on mudaraba (essentially profit and loss sharing contracts), the creation of an 
interest-free Islamic credit card, and promoted Kuala Lumpur as the centre for an Islamic 
capital market, particularly for sukuk in the 2000s (Haneef 2001; Warde 2010). Islamic 
capital markets, which could be deemed more Islamically acceptable than the prevailing debt-
based instruments in the banking sector would provide liquidity for the latter. Alongside 
these innovations and institutional instruments, the government eliminated stamp duty on a 
number of Islamic contracts (but especially Bai’-Bithaman ajil-based mortgages) through a 
series of orders in 2000, 2002, and 2004 (MIA, 2012). The comparatively consistent, Central-
bank-managed Sharia regulation, and relatively permissive innovation environment became 
attractive to Islamic bankers and financiers in Malaysia. The rapid expansion of IBF (with 
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assets growing by 49% between 1995 and 1999 even through the 1997 Asian financial crisis) 
encouraged the BNM to establish a central dominating Islamic regulator for IBF – the 
National Sharia Advisory Council (NSAC) in 1997; create another Islamic bank (Bank Bumi 
Muamalat) set growth targets for commercial banks providing Islamic finance, and formulate 
the Financial Sector Master Plan in 2001, which set an agenda for increasing IBF to 20% of 
the banking and insurance market by 2010. This target would in fact be met – even exceeded 
– and the government renamed the so-called ‘Interest-free banking system’ to the ‘Islamic 
Banking Scheme’, signaling the intent of policy-makers to focus increasingly on developing 
and legitimizing IBF (Karim 2010; Lai, 2015).   
 
4.3 Semi-developmentalism and Islamic ordoliberalism in the 21st century  
‘Semi-developmentalism’ persisted into the 21st century insofar as developmental 
initiatives continued to remain contested (Pepinsky 2009; Noh, 2014). Nonetheless, the 
support of IBF became more assertive in the 21st century which we are characterizing as an 
Islamic and internationalizing ordoliberalism. By 2001, the Malaysian government 
demonstrated a unique path among Islamic states by mixing innovative developments in 
Sharia-compliant finance with the gradual but dualistic Islamisation of the banking and 
finance systems in order to promulgate a form of Islamic capitalist development that 
acknowledged globally competitive financial markets, and which would encourage foreign 
investment in a country reeling from the Asian financial crisis. At the same time, it 
legitimated Mahathir’s version of Islamisation to many Malays at least, and encouraged 
Malays in both urban and rural areas to use IFIs. This had the additional benefit of drawing 
Malaysians in rural areas away from the PAS, thus potentially strengthening UMNO’s 
political power in the face of significant political victories by the PAS in the 1999 general 
elections (Lai, 2015; Nasr 2001; Rudnyckyj, 2014).  
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The gradual approval of Malaysian innovation by sharia scholars and bankers in the 
Gulf states further cemented Malaysia’s central role in the development of a more globally-
oriented IBF (Warde, 2008), as witnessed in the first sovereign sukuk issued by the 
Malaysian government in 2002 (Warde, 2010) in which half the investors were based in the 
Gulf States (Lai, 2015). With international acceptance of a certain ‘Malaysian model’ of IBF, 
the government pursued a strategy of internationalizing Malaysian IFIs during the first half of 
the 2000s, and welcomed foreign investment, initially by setting up the International Islamic 
Financial Market at its Labuan International Offshore Financial Center in 2001. This had the 
intent of establishing Labuan as another magnet for foreign Sharia-compliant investments 
(Venardos 2012; Warde 2010). After the lobbying push by Mahathir in 2002, the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) chose to locate the Islamic Financial Services 
Board (IFSB) in Kuala Lumpur in 2002, which marked another milestone in the positioning 
of Malaysia as a hub for Islamic financial services, and its internationalizing strategies.  
In 2004, three related and significant events transpired. First, the government opened 
up IBF to foreign (especially Gulf-based) IFIs, removed a number of restrictions on their 
operations, and incorporated them under the Islamic banking Act of 1983 (Razak and Karim 
2008; Warde 2010). Second, the BNM ended the ‘Islamic windows program’ and impelled 
conventional banks to set up fully Islamic subsidiaries as the Central Bank was worried about 
how the potentially haram activities of conventional banks would be separated from their 
Islamic windows. In practice however, the subsidiary ‘fell back on their “parents” to settle 
overnight debts rather than rely on the Islamic money market’ (Rudnyckyj, 2014, 79). Third, 
the Sharia advisory council of the Securities Commission established a parallel governance 
framework for the issuance of Islamic debt securities, although the NSAC would eventually 
become the ultimate arbiter of Sharia-compliance (we discuss this further below). This form 
of IBF infrastructure development continued under the leadership of Prime Minister Abdullah 
 16 
 
(2003-2009), with the creation of the International Centre for Education in Islamic Finance in 
2005 and the International Sharia Research Academy (ISRA) in 2008. The former provides a 
globally-oriented education on Islamic finance to mostly conventional bankers who do not 
have deep understanding of Sharia and Islamic contracts. The ISRA provides a pipeline 
between academics and practitioners of IBF in terms of practical research and aims to bridge 
knowledge of fatwa between the Middle East and Southeast Asia by translating fatwa from 
Arabic to English and back again. More specifically, it organizes two Sharia forums 
annually, which are designed to bring together participants from around the world to establish 
new Islamic networks in contradistinction to conventional networks and position Malaysia as 
a leader in the Islamic world (Rudnyckyj 2014).  
However, the establishment of these institutions should not be read as simply a form 
of state-directed developmentalism, as such quasi-state multilateral institutions are driven by 
the wish to globalize IBF and are governed by ‘globalizing technocrats’ rather than 
necessarily by state leaders (see Mohamad and Saravanamuttu 2015; Rundyckyj 2014). 
Nevertheless, beyond educational infrastructure, the state has continued to steer IBF in at 
least eight ways after the 2008 global financial crisis. While Lai (2015) refers to this 
‘steering’ as a ‘strategic developmental framework’, we suggest the concept of an Islamic 
ordoliberalism alongside purely ‘market rule’ and the private Islamic financial networks 
identified by Rudnyckyj (2014). First, the Malaysian government launched the Malaysia 
International Islamic Financial Centre initiative in 2006 that aimed to bring together both 
state actors and networks of private firms in the IBF industry (MIFC 2016). Second, within 
the Financial Sector Blueprint (2011-2020) developed under current Prime Minister Najib, 
the government has sanctioned mergers and acquisitions between Malaysian-owned IFIs to 
reduce competition (BNM, 2015), including Khazanah’s 2016 bid for Hong Leong’s 
Financial Group (FMT News, July 19, 2016). Third, it has continued to significantly alter the 
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size of the global sukuk market through its decision to issue sukuk (or not) (Reuters 9 July 
2015). Fourth, it increased the foreign equity partnership ceilings from 49 to 70% in 2009 for 
both Islamic banks and Takaful operations, while conventional banks were limited to 30% 
(BNM, 2009).  Fifth, it has remained pivotal in creating operational standards (in terms of 
accounting, governance, market conduct, and risk management) and ‘end-to-end compliance’ 
for all IFIs and conventional banks with ‘Islamic windows’. BNM has remained paramount 
here through the Central Bank of Malaysia Act (CBMA) of 2009 (that replaced a 1958 Act), 
in which the bank’s Sharia Advisory Council cemented its power over the judiciary as the 
chief arbiter and regulator of IBF in Malaysia (Mohamad and Saravanamattu, 2015). Sixth, 
the BNM created the Law Harmonisation Committee in 2010 to bridge divides between 
Sharia and civil law. Seventh, it helped to establish the Kuala Lumpur-headquartered Islamic 
Liquidity Management Corporation in the same year, which has sought to “facilitate cross-
border liquidity management”. In order to facilitate such flows in and out of Malaysia, the 
government required a coherent legal framework, which culminated in the Islamic Financial 
Services Act of 2013 (IFSA) and the 2013 takaful (insurance) laws that replaced the Islamic 
Banking Act and Takaful Acts of 1983 and 1984 respectively (BNM, 2013; IFSB 2015). 
Notably, the 2013 acts put in place penal consequences that would ensure that Sharia scholars 
were responsible for the Sharia-compliance of their rulings, suggesting a balancing on the 
part of the Malaysian government between the imperative of innovation and international 
competitiveness, with the religious conviction of sharia-compliance. Finally, in 2013, the 
BNM created favourable fiscal policies to develop Halal ‘pharma’, a Halal ‘bioeconomy’, 
and a Halal food certification program, both domestically and for export (IRTI, 2015).  
In examining the governance of IBF then, we demonstrated that the Malaysian 
government promoted IBF through a changing pattern of Islamic interventionism that we 
characterised as ‘semi-developmental’ in the 1980s and 1990s. However, by the early 2000s, 
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the growth of IBF began to increasingly involve, as both Rudnyckyj (2014) and Mohamad 
and Saravanamuttu (2015) stress, private ‘Islamic financial networks’ beyond the state. Such 
networks were shaped however through state support, which may in turn be considered an 
Islamic and internationalising ordoliberalism, rather than simply ‘market rule’.  
 
5  Singapore 
5.1 Promoting IBF as Complementing IFC Growth 
 While the development of IBF in Malaysia was positioned as a vital element of its 
IFC strategy, by promoting Kuala Lumpur as the centre for an Islamic capital market 
standards setting and regulatory governance, IBF in Singapore is seen as niche market within 
a broader government strategy of financial innovation in building a broad-based IFC. This 
explains the relatively early but rather tentative and piecemeal approach taken by the state in 
engaging with IBF products and related governance structures. The first Islamic financial 
product, the Mendaki Growth Fund, was launched in 1991 as one of the earliest Sharia 
compliant funds worldwide (Gulf-Asia Sharia Compliant Investments Association 2014). 
Two new Islamic insurance (takaful) schemes followed in 1995, both supported by 
government organisations such as Keppel Bank (a government-owned bank), and NTUC 
Income (a large insurance co-operative with close government ties). These takaful products 
were billed as test cases before further steps were taken to introduce other IBF products 
(AMPRO Holdings 1995). After these initial forays, IBF activities in Singapore remained 
rather obscure through the rest of the 1990s with no particularly significant development. 
Although the government took the initial step in bringing IBF to market, it then took a back 
seat to observe how the IBF market might develop organically. During this period, the 
interest in IBF products proved rather limited amongst both Muslim and non-Muslim 
financial consumers (Gerrard and Cunningham 1997) due to a general lack of awareness 
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about IBF products and with plenty of other options available in the conventional market for 
financial and investment products.  
This began to change in the early 2000s with growing potential for increased trade 
and financial ties with the Middle East. In this sense, the development of IBF was driven 
more by external political economic considerations, as compared to the domestic factors that 
were prevalent in Malaysia. With augmented investment flows between the Middle East and 
the growing economies of Asia, Singapore’s status as an IFC was specifically highlighted in 
government speeches as being particularly important in intermediating and facilitating such 
capital flows and economic ties (Goh 2005). The mounting interest and relevance of IBF in 
Singapore was therefore intended to leverage on (and further extend) the economic 
competitiveness of Singapore as a financial hub, which stands in contrast with the issues of 
ethnic politics and legitimacy in Malaysia.  This explains the Singaporean government’s 
wholesale approach to IBF, as compared to the more retail-based approach in Malaysia. Since 
Singapore has a much smaller domestic market for IBF, unlike neighbouring Malaysia and 
Indonesia, the focus has been on building off the infrastructure currently in place, to offer 
wholesale market activities in the areas of capital markets activities and wealth management, 
and persuading financial institutions to add on IBF products and services to the existing suite 
of activities. As explained by the then deputy director of the Monetary Authority of 
Singapore (MAS):  
We have previously preferred to let the market find its own pace and 
niche.  Increasingly though, we recognise that if Singapore, as a major 
financial centre, were to be a part in the global growth of Islamic 
finance, MAS has to be involved in the market's future development, 
and sooner rather than later (Ong 2005).  
 20 
 
As the IBF sector took on greater strategic importance for Singapore’s role as an 
international financial centre and regional hub, the government adopted a more proactive 
stance towards stimulating IBF activities. Rather than direct intervention in the IBF sector, 
the MAS adopted a more market-oriented approach in shaping the scope of IBF development 
through  regulatory reviews, greater participation in international Islamic governing bodies 
and, later on, tax revisions for IBF products. Instead of establishing a separate regulatory 
framework for IBF, MAS applied a common framework as it considered an Islamic bank to 
encounter the same types of risks (e.g. credit risk, liquidity risk and operational risks) and 
similar prudential and supervisory issues as a conventional bank (Vernados, 2012). As a 
prudential regulator, MAS does not prescribe what constitutes Sharia compliance nor endorse 
specific Sharia rulings and the responsibility would lie with Islamic banks (or conventional 
banks offering IBF products) to take into account Sharia compliance and to manage this 
compliance risk as part of their overall risk management process (Chia and Wang 2008). 
Folding IBF within a common regulatory framework thus allows for greater flexibility in 
financial innovation and future market development, as it keeps the doors open for potential 
intersections between Islamic and conventional finance, in terms of financial expertise, 
business reorganisation, and potential investors.    
The year 2005 marked the beginnings of accelerated regulatory developments in 
opening up greater scope for IBF activities in Singapore (Islamic Finance News 2009). First, 
the MAS remitted the additional stamp duties that Islamic financing arrangements on 
property were incurring, and allowed banks to offer Murabahah financing. Second, it joined 
the Kuala Lumpur-based Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) as a full member, after 2 
years in ‘observer status’. Through participation in the various working groups and task 
forces in areas like supervisory review, Islamic money markets, capital adequacy, liquidity 
management and solvency requirements for takaful operations, the MAS was acquiring much 
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needed technical knowledge and building professional networks (MAS 2011). At the same 
time, Singapore’s experience with global financial governance bodies was deemed 
particularly advantageous as developing IBF regulatory expertise could be nurtured ‘by 
sharing [MAS’] own experience in other international regulatory working committees such as 
banking’s BIS, securities’ IOSCO, and insurance’s IAIS’ (Ong 2005).  Third, a series of tax 
policies in 2006-2008 were implemented to boost the IBF market, such as tax clarification on 
murabaha financing and sukuk, which gave participants the same regulatory protection under 
Singapore’s Bank Act as any conventional depositor. Tax concessions were also granted on 
qualifying Sharia-compliant financial activities, including lending, fund management, 
insurance and reinsurance. Finally, new regulations in 2009 permitting banks to conduct new 
IBF activities (e.g. murabaha interbank placements, ijara, and spot murabaha) also sent a 
clear signal to markets encouraging financial innovation (MAS 2011).  
 
5.2  IBF beyond Singapore: Leveraging on IFC networks 
Since the late 2000s, IBF activities have grown at a quicker pace with the issuance of 
numerous sukuk programmes and murabaha financing deals, with particular success in 
Sharia-compliant REITs. Singapore’s role as a leading insurance centre in Asia is also 
evident in attracting cross-border IBF activities. In the late-2000s, for instance, the issue 
managers of sukuk by Pakistan and the Malaysian state of Sarawak held road shows in 
Singapore to reach out to the established pool of institutional investors. Leveraging on the 
critical mass of reinsurers based in Singapore is also deemed beneficial for takaful players 
seeking to collaborate with reinsurers in Singapore to provide retakaful capacity (Teo 2005). 
A significant push was represented by the launch of Singapore’s first sukuk facility in 2009 
backed by the MAS (the first such move by a conventional central bank). Under this 
program, MAS issues the sukuk according to the capital and liquidity requirements of 
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financial institutions in Singapore which offer or plan to offer Sharia-compliant financial 
services. The sukuk is priced against the liquid Singapore Government Securities market, 
which provides a transparent price discovery mechanism and also provides a strong boost of 
confidence in a new financial market. The facility underscores the MAS’ commitment to 
support the development of IBF in Singapore with the aim that greater levels of Sharia-
compliant activities would ‘attract both Muslim and non-Muslim investors who are interested 
in ethical investing, and therefore diversify financial institutions’ sources of funding and 
deepen the investor base’ (MAS 2011). This positions IBF in Singapore amongst a broader 
suite of products and services related to socially responsible investing or ethical investing, 
which has been a growing global trend in recent years (Global Sustainable Investment 
Alliance, 2014). A total of 31 sukuk has been issued in Singapore. In 2012, the Axiata Group 
priced a CNY1 billion (US$158.06 million) sukuk Wakalah, which at the time was the largest 
yuan-denominated sukuk issued. The listing in yuan denomination was in line with 
Singapore’s growing status as an offshore RMB centre for trading and settlement. Even 
Malaysia’s investment fund, Khazanah Nasional, has listed two sukuk issuances in Singapore 
worth almost US$500 million each (Islamic Finance News 2014). By listing in Singapore, 
these issuances have been able to capitalise on a wider range of expertise such as legal, 
accounting, and financial expertise for the creation of special purpose vehicles (see Wojcik 
2013) and tap into potential investors that tend to cluster in an established IFC like 
Singapore. Therefore, while increasing trade with the Middle East provided initial strategic 
reasons for developing IBF in Singapore, the appeal of this emerging financial sector is also 
set against the growing interest of investors based within and outside of Singapore in various 
forms of ethical investments (Šoštarić 2015). The orientation for the IBF market in Singapore 
is distinctively outward looking, with the objective of building up IBF activities alongside 
existing financial market segments and the attraction of both Muslim and non-Muslim 
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investors. The development of IBF in Singapore within existing markets and expertise is 
particularly evident in the form of Sharia compliant real estate investment trusts (REITs). 
Singapore has been an established centre for the listing of REITs and business trusts since 
2008. As the largest REITs market in Asia outside Japan, it could capitalise on those 
expertise to take the lead in the listing of Sharia compliant REITs (Saeed 2011). Sabana 
REIT, founded in 2010, is Singapore’s first Islamic REIT and the largest by global assets. 
Although Sabana has been launched for only a short time, it has already outperformed REITs 
listed in Malaysia.  
While the Islamic REITs market seems to be an area where Singapore has some 
competitive advantage over Malaysia (Suhana et al. 2012), the banking sector has developed 
in more uneven ways. The Islamic Bank of Asia was launched in 2007 as a joint venture 
between DBS Bank and Middle Eastern private investors. While it enjoyed a solid start as the 
only Islamic bank in Singapore, with visible government backing (through DBS Bank)2 and 
Middle Eastern interests, the business proved unsustainable. In September 2015, DBS Bank 
announced that it was no longer cost-effective to maintain the Islamic Bank of Asia as a 
separate entity and it would be closing over the next 2 to 3 years, with its business being 
folded into an IBF ‘window’ within DBS Bank. This development is emblematic of the 
market-led approach taken by the Singapore state in sending strong signals and providing 
some incentives to encourage IBF engagement but still largely leaving to market participants 
to determine the direction and extent of IBF development. Other banks in Singapore, for 
example Citibank, Standard Chartered and OCBC have chosen to engage with IBF by 
offering Sharia compliant products as part of their expanding suite of financial services. 
Malaysian banks CIMB and Maybank seem to have been particularly successful in this 
endeavor, backed by experience in their home market. On the other hand, HSBC closed its 
Islamic banking division in Singapore (along with UAE, UK, Bahrain and Bangladesh)3 in 
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2013 as part of a global strategic review of its Islamic financing business to focus on 
customers in Malaysia and Saudi Arabia. Outside of commercial and retail banking, other 
IFIs such as Arcapita, Al Salam Bank-Bahrain and AEP Investment Management (AEP) 
seem to have more stable presence in Singapore. In this respect, the development of IBF in 
Singapore has been much more uneven due to the lack of direct state intervention (compared 
to Malaysia) and as industry players in Singapore find themselves shaped by strategic 
business concerns of their global networks that are embedded in conventional financial 
markets.  
In terms of developing broader industry capacity, significant efforts have been 
directed at education and skills training to promote high quality research and professional 
education in IBF both for the Singapore market and to forge international ties (Heng 2009). 
The International Islamic Law and Finance Centre was established by Singapore 
Management University (SMU) in June 2010 to boost support for the growth and innovation 
of Islamic finance in the region, followed by a Master of Laws in Islamic Law & Finance in 
2012. Singapore also hosted the IFSB summit in 2009 and the World Islamic Banking 
Conference Asia for several years; these were aimed at developing regulatory and 
knowledge-sharing capacities at a regional and global level in ways that seek to integrate 
Sharia compliance and interpretations with ‘global rule regimes’ in areas such as enabling 
product and documentation standardization across jurisdictions (MAS, 2011; International 
Finance Magazine, n.d.). Rather than explicit and aggressive pursue of IBF development and 
governance structures through systemic changes to domestic rule regimes and extending the 
power of national regulators as in the case of the NSAC in Malaysia (Mohamad and 
Saravanamuttu, 2015), Singapore has taken a more diffused approach by developing industry 
expertise and human resources through educational institutions and engagements with global 
organizations and knowledge networks.  
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While there has been significant development in IBF in Singapore particularly over 
the past decade, the Singapore market still has relatively few IFIs as compared to Malaysia. It 
also suffers from the lack of a domestic market with no Islamic pension funds and little 
business demands for Sharia compliant financial vehicles (Maierbrugger 2014). In this sense, 
Singapore’s struggles with developing the IBF sector could be because its domestic rule 
regimes are not Islamically-inflected enough in order to create a critical mass of IBF 
expertise, institutions, products and investors. While the MAS has clearly demonstrated a 
commitment to IBF as a key sector for Singapore IFC development (Venardos 2012), the 
Singaporean government is banking on a wider neoliberal strategy that has driven its IFC 
development thus far. In this case, IBF fits into this overall strategy as part of creating more 
diverse financial sectors and deeper capital markets within a regulatory climate that 
welcomes financial innovation and new financial institutions (Lai and Tan, 2015). The 
enmeshing of global financial networks, national economic development strategies and 
Islamically-inflected modes of market making have unfolded in quite distinctive ways in a 
non-Islamic jurisdiction amidst wider political economic trends of increasing Middle Eastern 
and Asian trade and investment linkages (Siow, 2015).  
 
6  CONCLUSIONS  
In response to the limited engagement with critical conceptual thought on the 
governance of IBF, this paper aimed to compare and conceptualize the development and 
governance of IBF in Malaysia and Singapore since the 1980s. In particular, we focused on 
the ways in which this has unfolded in variegated ways, including the significance of ethnic 
politics, the often contentious moral suasion involved in establishing IBF products and 
services, the character and timing of innovation, the centralization of Sharia compliance, the 
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nature of tax incentives, and the strength of regulatory and financial support. Some of these 
differences are summarized in Table 1.  
 
*** Table 1 around here ***  
 
The debate on the development and governance of IBF in Malaysia specifically (but 
which also has implications for Singapore) rests on either more ‘developmentalist-oriented’ 
arguments such as Lai’s (2015) ‘industrial policy’ oriented towards finance, or on the other 
hand, Mohamad and Saravanamuttu’s (2015) ‘neoliberal exceptions’ and Rudnyckyj’s (2014) 
‘afterlives of development’. With this debate in mind, and as we worked on conceptualizing 
commonalities and differences in the evolution of IBF, we relied on what Liow (2012) 
broadly calls a ‘neoliberal-developmentalist state’. However, we nuanced this by arguing that 
for Malaysia, this involved a transition from a ‘semi-developmentalism’ in the 1980s and 
1990s (that is a set of governance practices partly shaped by, and legitimated through an 
ethnic politics) to an Islamic and internationalizing ordoliberalism, in which the Malaysian 
government in particular established a complex ‘Islamic infrastructure’ that facilitated the 
growth of IBF. This included a broader ecosystem of ‘private networks beyond the state’, as 
highlighted by Rudnyckyj (2014). Nonetheless, the Sharia-compliance of products and 
services created through these networks are carefully regulated by centralized institutions 
such as the SACs of the BNM and the SC, and the Malaysian government has continued to 
steer the development and governance of IBF in the 2010s.  
While Islamisation, innovation, widespread Muslim participation, and substantial 
state support and regulation in Malaysia drove the growth and governance of IBF, the 
Singaporean state has sought to enroll and capture IBF as a niche market into its wider 
strategy of growing the IFC capacity of Singapore. The promotion of IBF is thus framed 
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through the logics of financial innovation and international competitiveness. Some aspects of 
IBF growth (e.g. sukuk, Islamic REITs) have benefitted from Singapore’s incumbent status as 
an established IFC with well-developed capital markets and a deep pool of regional and 
global investors. However, low levels of public awareness, weak domestic demand, and 
insufficient talent and expertise in IBF and managing Sharia-compliant risk are key 
challenges to the kind of IBF growth seen in neighboring Muslim-majority countries like 
Malaysia and Indonesia. Therefore, while Singapore’s prudential regulatory environment, tax 
policies and strong government support has encouraged financial innovation in IBF (as well 
as other financial markets) through a ‘neoliberal developmentalist’ strategy, its IBF sector 
might not be Islamically-inflected enough to achieve the level of product innovation and 
influence on global Islamic knowledge networks as seen in Malaysia. On the other hand, 
growth in IBF activities appears more promising in areas that intersect strongly with 
conventional financial markets and existing expertise, such as Islamic REITs and insurance 
and reinsurance for takaful products. It remains to be seen whether this neoliberal 
developmentalist approach to IBF will create a critical mass of IBF expertise, institutions, 
and products to have sufficient clout and impact in global IBF markets. Especially when 
juxtaposed against Malaysia, the case of Singapore demonstrates the value of a critical 
conceptual approach in analyzing the intersections of IFA and IBF that explains the 
variegated unfolding and impacts of IBF development.  
In terms of future research on the development and governance of IBF in southeast 
Asia, we would highlight the value of exploring the intersection of first, an emergent ‘Islamic 
international financial architecture’ (IIFA) (Iqbal 2007; Rethel 2010a), that includes, but is 
not limited to organizations such as AAOIFI and IFSB; second, the apparently increasing 
weight of an Asian regional financial architecture as witnessed for example in the 
partnerships between the Asian Development Bank, IFIs, and Islamic regulatory institutions, 
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and third, the IFA as discussed at the beginning of this paper. This would move the 
discussion away from simply ‘methodologically nationalist’ treatments of the growth and 
governance of IBF to the articulation of national political economies and different forms of 
supra-national governance in an ostensibly post-neoliberal world.  
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Notes 
1 There has been ongoing debates about the extent to which Southeast Asian states are truly 
developmental in nature (Rigg, 2009) and evolving conceptions of the ‘developmental state’ 
and its contemporary relevance (Hayashi, 2010; Stubbs, 2009), which we are unable to 
engage with explicitly in this paper due to space constraints. 
2 The Singapore government is a majority shareholder of DBS Bank.  
3 https://www.hsbc.com.bd/1/2/amanah-commercial-banking-faq 
                                               
